In contrast with earlier findings indicating that public information campaigns produce little change in public attitudes and behaviors, current research suggests that the Advertising Council's "Take a Bite Out of Crime" campaign, initiated in 1979, has had a substantive impact on the pub4c's response to crime prevention. Data from a national survey of public reactions to the campaign, as well as a panel sample examining changes in citizen crime prevention orientation, suggest that the public service messages have made people more aware of prevention techniques, more optimistic about the effectiveness of citizen-instituted prevention activities, and more involved in actively preventing crime. As a direct result of the televised messages; nearly one-quarter of thè ,exposed survey respondents adopted additional ,safety measures such as leaving on their outside light, or asking neighbors to watch their house when they were away. Most significantly, a0 increasing number of, respondents became involved in neighborhood c4ime prevention techniques. The failure of the campaign to increase either concern about crime or a sense of responsibility for its prevention may, in one sense, be a positive feature, as it indicates the campaign heightened public awareness of a problem without increasing the individual's sense of vulnerability. (MM) *********************************************************************** ReproductiOns supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made from the original document. **************,******************************************************** 
In contrast with earlier findings indicating that public information campaigns produce little change in public attitudes and behaviors, current research suggests that the Advertising Council's "Take a Bite Out of Crime" campaign, initiated in 1979, has had a substantive impact on the pub4c's response to crime prevention. Data from a national survey of public reactions to the campaign, as well as a panel sample examining changes in citizen crime prevention orientation, suggest that the public service messages have made people more aware of prevention techniques, more optimistic about the effectiveness of citizen-instituted prevention activities, and more involved in actively preventing crime. As a direct result of the televised messages; nearly one-quarter of thè ,exposed survey respondents adopted additional ,safety measures such as leaving on their outside light, or asking neighbors to watch their house when they were away. Most significantly, a0 increasing number of, respondents became involved in neighborhood c4ime prevention techniques. The failure of the campaign to increase either concern about crime or a sense of responsibility for its prevention may, in one sense, be a positive feature, as it indicates the campaign heightened public awareness of a problem without increasing the individual's sense of vulnerability. (MM) *********************************************************************** ReproductiOns supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made from the original document. **************,******************************************************** Recent studies of the impact of public information campaigns indicate they may have greater efficacy than the research of previous decades suggested. This paper presents preliminary data from an ongoing studyin-progress which supports that view. Summarized are results of an evaluation of the public impact of the Advertisirig Council's "Take a Bite Out of Crime" campaign, aimed at promoting greater citizen involvement in crime prevention activities.
The data are derived from a national sample survey of.public reactions to the campaign, as well as a panel sample examining changes in citizen crime prevention orientations and behaviors as a function of exposure to the campaign.
The findings suggest that the Advertising Council's Take a Bite Out of Crime PSAs had marked and consistent influences on citizen perceptions. and attitudes regarding crime prevention, as well as on their taking of specific preventative actions.
Individuals exposed to the campaign exhibited significant increases over those`not exposed.in how much they thought they knew about crime prevention; how effective they thought citizen prevention efforts were; and how confident they felt about being able to protect themselves from crime. The PSAs also appeared to have a strong impact on the taking of crime prevention actions by citizens. Exposure to the campaign was significantly related to increases in six of the seven specific preventative activities most emphasized.in televised PSAs.
Particularly noteworthy were campaignrelated increases in neighborhood cooperative crime prevention efforts.
Taken at face value; these findings go far in refuting many of the hypotheses and assumptions concerning campaign efficacy posed in earlier decades. And, they tend to support more recently suggested views of the media having the potential for more substantial persuasive effects. (BRIEF ABSIBACT) A panel survey study of the influences of the Advertising Council's "Take a Bite Out of Crime" public information campaign suggests that such campaigns have greater efficacy than the research of previous decades had indicated. The findings provide evidence that the campaign had significant effects on Citizen perceptions of and attitudes toward crime prevention, and on their taking of ope,tific preventative actions. The results overall tend to support a view of the media as having an increased potential for persuasive impact.
While public service-oriented media campaign effects research has a long tradition going back to now-classic field studies of the 1940s and early 1950s, the area went througha period of relative dormancy until fairly recently. At least partly at the root of that dormant period in the late 1950s and 1960s were inferences from the previous research that media campaigns were apt to hal.w few if any effects, and when they did occur they were likely to be among particular segments of the population who were primarily seeking reinforcement of their already existing attitudes and behaviors (cf. Star and Hughes, 1950; Hyman and Sheatsley, 1947; Klapper, 1960) . Such "limited effects" hypotheses were by no means peculiar to campaign research; indeed, early studies of media effects on such diverse activities as childhood socialization, aggressive behavior, and voting behavior generally reached the same kinds of conclusions.
However, research endeavors into these same areas over the past decade have led to substantially revised conceptions of the kinds of effect; media are capable of having on individual and social behavior. However, the collective findings from these studies suggest rather strongly that such campaigns may have noteworthy effects on audiences.' Perhaps the most striking data, as well as conceptual elaborations, are'found in the multi-year community heart disease prevention project underway at Stanford University (cf. Maccoby and Solomon, 1981) .
Those results"` suggest rather salient effects of mass media messages per se on public cognitions, attitudes and behaviors concerning heart disease prevention.
One difficuy found throughout-the recent research on campaigns has been a lack of consistent conceptual or theoretical perspectives to guide problem development and design. However, as more data-centered evaluative studies continue to contradict the earlier limited effects-related hypotheses, more elaborate models will surely be developed. And, they are likely to be based upon assumptions that it is critical to investigate the contingencies underwhich different media messages result in different effects for different k of people under different circumstances and at different ?Vs points in tim . That is, media effects are unlikely to be found en masse, or to be attributable to any one set of factors. Rather, it may be more important to determine which factors are most operative in given communication situations involving given audiences.
The purpose of this paper is to report prelfminary data from 10 an ongoing study-in-progress, which we feel has several strong implications for the way in which we look at the efficacy By most critical accounts, the campaign caught on in terms of media placement because of the 'soaring concern over-crime in recent years, and its use of a rather clever cartoon dog, "McGruff," arrayed in trenchcsat and admonishing citizens to follow the example of ''real people" prototypes who through various means helped "Take a bite out of crime." From a research perspective, the campaign unfortunately presents several obstacles to well-controlled evaluatioi,of its effects on citizens. Secondly,.the,national-scale dissemination logistics of the campaign negated any ability on our part to ":ontrol" the dissemination for evaluative purposes.
The campaign'in total incorporates the more obvious media campaign utilizing public service advertisements, and perhaps less obvious but potentially equally important commaity projects in hundreds of locales all over the U.S. The localized projects are highly diversified and dependent upon, individual community needs and resources. The media campaign,serves as something of an umbrella for these, providing a shared identity and rationale. .Our concern in this study at this point is almost exclusively with the impact on the public-at-large of the media zampaign. Nationwide, the public service advertisements were, as of November 198L, by far the most visible aspect of the campaign, and the aspect of it with the greatest potential for impact on citizens overall as of that time;
Conceptual Background
In the most general terms, we view the campaign as having been largely concerned with effecting increased citizen competence in helping to reduce crime.
The term "prevention competence" serves as an organizing rubric encompassing several kinds of orientations and behaviors through which citizens may demonstrate their ability in the crime prevention arena. -Prevention competence is likely to increase among citizens to the extent that they:
(1)
Are more fully aware of effective prevention techniques;
Hold positive attitudes about the'effectiveness of citizen-initiated prevention activities, and about thej.y own responsibility for getting With varying degrees of conceptual sophistication, persuasion is usually apt to be seen as at least a four-step process involving:
(1 This would seem particularly true of actions requiring little rationalization, cost or effect (Ray, 1973) .
It) is also important to note that the Take a Bite Out of Crime campaign, particularly insofar as the PSAs are concerned, was aimed at "the public"
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In a highly diversified manner. A reasonable"
'possibilitymistsuhat the campaign would have scattershot influences on various types of people depending upon their already existing orientations toward crime and prevention--perhaps simply informing some, changing selected attitudes in others, making still others more concerned, and perhaps triggering some into action. For example, if a particular citizen is already concerned about crime, and already feels that self-prevention / . techniques may be effective, the campaign/May have provided informap.on about, specific prevention techniques and how to use them, prompting "action."
The public service advertisemtnt format renders placement of specifik ads within specific locales over the country quite haphazard and dependent upon the willingness of media outlets to incorporate them as space and time permit.
Moreover, the design of the campaign made no allowance for attempted dissemination of the PSAs in particular communities while withholding the messages from others, making classic "treatment versus control community" field experiment designs impossible. Thus our overall research effort is based upon the "next best" design options available:
The use of a national sample survey to determine the reach or penetration of the campaign over the nation as a whole and within various kinds of citizen subgroups; Cook and Campbell; 1979) . However, they can be quite appropriate in pointing to general trends insofar as campaign exposure and effectiveness are concerned. This is particularly true giver the addect, advantage of comparing the campaign-related changes found in the panel with respondents' own self-reports and interpretations' from the national sample.
6. However, attentiveness to the PSAs was much leSs uniform, with greater attention to them being paid-by persons previously more knowledgeable and confident regarding prevention, and those more concerned , about protecting themselves. Individuals engaged in more prevention activities were also more attentive, as were those who anticipated that more information about prevention would benefit them. Thus selective exposure was found to be only a minor factor here, perhaps not surprising in an ae of ubiquitous television commercials. However, selective attention proved far more prominent.
While, with a few exceptions, exposure rates do seem relatively homogenous across the sample, this should not of course imply that the messages were perceived in the same way by persons with varied orientations to crime and prevention, nor that the messages were as effective for some 7. here, -we will consider those crime prpvention orientations and behaviors which the campaign would seem to have had the greatest potential for influencing during its first two years. The hierarchical regression analysis in the lower.part of the table   . indicates that the relationship between exposure and perceived knowledge remains significant (beta = .08) %hen the other potential intervening variables are controlled for. 3 exposed group "changed more," but'also the control of extraneous variables ,which may have interactively influenced either campaign.exosure, or the change measure over-time, or both simultaneously. While. 17t 'n impossible to constrain the influence of all potential extraneous variables, we can make some good judgments about what kinds of variables would be most Likely to intervene, and control for theM accordingly. Toward that end, our analyses uilizE a rather stringent hierarchical multiple regression control procedure.
The most obvious potential intervening variables appeared to be: (1) Respondent encounters with crime prevention campaigns other than McGruff; (2) EXposure to crime-related mass media content; and, of course, (3),Direct encounters with crime, or having-been victimized. Measures of each of these stimuli were inserted into the regression equation as a'131 -k immediately preceding the campaign exposure measure., As a more conservative device, we also chose to include in the equation as cpntrol variableda blcok of five demographic indiCators which appeared most closely associated with_cippaign exposure And prevention orientations, including age, Sex, education, income and neighborhood" social status. These were included as a block prior 'to the above one.
It appeareahlikely that any unidentified extraneous variables tepding-to Influence the change scores would do so unevenly across at least some of those demographics, . and thus '"controlling" for the demographics should help minimize their 4- impact. It was also hoped that this would help minimize any effects based 'upon interact4on between the pie-campaign interviewing roond,and exposure--to the campaign or other intervening stimuli.
S.
3 Specifically, the 1979,knowledge scbre (Time 1 or "Tl") was entered as the first block of the regression equation allowing it to explain as much of the variation in the 1981 (Time 2) knowledge score as it could.
In the second block of the equation, the., demographic indicators were entered as.a "generalized" control on unspecified extraneous variables. The third.block consisted of the three factors --apart from McGruff campaign exposure--most likely to directly affect preVention knowedge: ,(1) Victimization experience; (2) Atten-. tion to news and entertainment media 'crime content; and (3) Exposure, to other prevention campaigns. Finally,-exposure to McGruff was entered as a dummy variable in the-fourthblock,'with that beta value reflecting the singular impact of campaign expospre on knowledge, with the effects of the other .variables on knoWledge."controlled out." 9.
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The regression analysis fdi prevention knowledge also indicates that exposure to other prevention campaigns was also associated with gains in knowledge over the two-year period (beta = .10), and that men gained more in knowledge than did women (beta = .08). The possibility that those or other variables may have interacted with campaign exposure so that they acted in ccIbination to affect. prevention knowledge will be considered later in the study.
Table 1 also Indicates that campaign exposure was not associated with changes in prevention responsibility (uncontrolled beta = -.02; controlled beta = -.03), but that exposure was related to mo're positive attitudes concerning the efficacy of personal prevention behaviers.
And, changes in prevention confidence, but not Concern, were related to exposure to the McGruff campaign.
These findings are strongly supportive of (and in turn are reinforced by) self-reports of respondents in the national sample according to what they said they thought they had gained from PSAs.
The lack of impact of campaign exposure on concern aboufprotecting oneself from crime lends itself to some ambiguity in interpretation.
On the one hand, a goal of the campaign is to make citizens concerned enough so that they will act appropriately, 'Alt not soconceraed as to unduly frighten them.
Given a finding that concern about prevention in the 1979 data was substantially correlated with heightened perceptions of crime in one's own'environment,' and greater personal vulnerability, it may actually be a "plus" for the campaign that it did not significantly increase such concern. Indeed, the PSAs, by emphasizing the most positive approaches to crimprevention, appear to Shave built more positive citizen dispositions--knowledge, sense of efficacy, and confidence--while at the same time minimizing potentially more negative orientations toward prevention.
Crime Orientation Effects to Before moving ahead into discussing the effects of the campaign on preventative behaviors, it may be helpful to take note of the campaigns's p?tential for affecting citizen's orientations toward crime per se.
It could be argued that while the campaign was having positive influences on certain prevention dispositions, it may have been doing so at the expense of making individuals more fearful of crime or seeing themselves as more vulnerable to it.
10.
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The panel sample respondents were asked in both waves of the survey:
(1) Whether they thought the crime rate was increasing or decreasing in their neighborhoods; (2) How safe they felt being out in their neighborhoods at night; (3) How dangerous in terms of crime they saw their own neighborhoods as compared to otherc; (4) How likely they thought it was that their residenceS would be burglarized;and (5) How likely they thought it was that they would be attacked or robbed.
The findings presented in Table 2 On the other hand, the overall theme of "crime" in the PSAs may have also heightened their general concern about it, channeling that concern more into thoughts about violent crime, which most of the PSAs dealt very little with.
It also appears that attention to media crime content in general is strongly related to many citizen orientations toward crime, particularly their perceived vulnerability. The previous tables also picked up a positive relationship between media crime attention and prevention concern and the perceived effectiveness of citizen prevention techniques. While more fully developed analyses of this relationship are beyond our scope here, they will be more fully considered later in the project, the campaign was effective in stimulating behavioral change, it was expected that persons exposed to it would have been likelier than those unexposed to have either adopted or begun "doing more of" specific kinds of activities.
As others have alluded to (Lavrakas, 1980; Skogan and Maxfield, 1981) Obviously, some individual actions are going to be relatively easy for some people while costly for others, and we do not offer this scheMa as a uniform "Scale" of difficulty. Rather, it is a way of organizing a wide range of diN3lerse actions in a reasonably coherent manner. Moreover, we have discriminated within the "behavioral" actions and the "purchase" actions by noting ones associated with target hardening, deterrence, surveillance, personal precaution, loss reduction, and cooperation with others, borrowing heavily from Lavrakas and Skogan and Maxfield.
Our full array of preventive actions is as follows:
Locking doors in the home, even when only leaving for a short time.
Keeping doors locked, even when at home.
Deterrence
Leaving on indoor lights when away from home at night. Leaving on outdoor lights when away from home at night. When away for more than a day or so, using a time to turn on lights or radio.
Surveillance
When away from home for more than a day or so, notifying police so that they will keep a special watch. When away for more than a day or so, stopping delivery of things like newspapers or mail, or asking someone to bring them in. When away for more than a day or so, having a neighbor watch your residence.
Precaution
When going out after dark, going with someone else because of crime. Going out by car instead of walking at night because of crime. Taking something along with you when going out that could be used as protection against being attacked, assaulted or _nbbed. Avoiding certain places in your neighborhood at night. Thus we might argue that "positive" changes, i.e. in the direction of "doing more," in any of the prevention activities among those exposed to the campaign.provide some evidence of its impact on behavior. But also, we may have more concrete assurance of the effectiveness of the campaign if more changes are found among those activities that were clearly advocated 4 There is an additional problem in that local prevention groups may have used the McGruff logo, whether sanctioned or fot, as a tie-in to their own campaigns. 1-1-e,we know, for example, that buying or carrying "protective devices" such las guns or tear gas were never advocated in the PSAs or in any other formal aspect of the campaign, we may be less certain as to whether such actions may have been implied by prevention interest groups perhaps using the campaign as a springboard. Furthermore, we have no assurance-that some individuals who were prompted by the campaign to view individual action-taking as more effective "tramilated" that disposition on their own into such behaviors as weapon purchasing.
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a in the specific PSAs to which respondents were more exposed. Since 71 percent of the respondents said they saw the ads most often over television, it seems reasonable to expect that, to the extent that the campaign was having an impact, it would be best discerned among those activities specifi- In terms of emphasis, the first four of the above actions were mentioned in the original "Stop a Crime" PSA, but the latter three served as the overall themes for the two more recent ads, "Gilstraps" and "Mimi Marth." As for the other activities, no other specific behaviors (police security checks, not going out at night alone, etc.) were mentioned or alluded to in the televised PSAs, nor were any of the prevention purchases recommended.
Prevention Activity Effects
Out of the seven prevention activities the campaign would seem most likely to have influenced, significant changes associated with exposure to the campaign were found in six.
No changes traceable to campaign exposure were found in any of the other activities, save one--having acquired a dog at least partly for security purposes.
This striking finding strongly suggests a marked and consistent influence of the campaign on citizens' crime prevention activities. Moreover, the one 15. case in which.a significant campaign effect was expected but not found was that of more frequently locking doors when leaving the residence.
Here, there is strong evidence of a "ceiling effect" precluding measurable chan6, ,since 75 percent of the respondents in the first wave of interviews reported "always" locking up to oegin with. And, the only significant result found among the "less expected" activities--that of acquiring a dog--is obviously tied to the campaign's overall theme. We turn to the findings in detail.
The analyses follow the same pattern as described earlier for the prevention orientation effects. In Table 3 we See Chat neither of the target hardening behaviors--locking doors when out of, or when in, the However, persons exposed to the PSAs were signifcantly likelier to have asked a neighbor to keep an eye on their homes when they were out, as recommended in "Stop a Crime."
None of the changes in the taking of personal precautions when out of the house were related to campaign exposure (Table 4) ; nor were they mentioned in the televised PSAs. It might be noted that exposure to campaigns other than McGruff was significantly related to changes in three of the four precautionary measures, indicating that there was some publicity given to those actions among the panel cities.
The strongest relationships between McGruff exposure.and behavioral changes occurred among the cooperative action-taking steps, which also received the heaviest emphasis in the "Gilstraps" and "Mimi Marth" PSAs.
Campaign exposure was significantly correlated with increases in "keeping a watch" outside one's home (beta = .11), reporting suspicious events to the police (beta = .13), and joining crime prevention groups or organizations (beta = .09) ( Table 5 ). The strength of these relationships is particularly noteworthy given that these can be regarded as fairly "costly" actions to take in terms of time and effort--at least certainly moreso than, say, 16.
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locking, up or leaving on lights. As with the precautionary actions, exposure' to prevention campaigns other than McGruff was also significantly related to positive changes in cooperative behaviors, again suggesting comdunity-based campaign efforts advocating such in the panel locales.
On the whole, the PSAs appear to have been most effective in promoting cooperativebehaviors, followed by certain deterrence and surveillance actions.
1

Purchasing Activity Effects
The campaign overall generally downplayed the need for citizens to spend money on property protection by purchasing such things as burglar alarms, theft insurance and particularly, weapons. We have also included under "purchases" activities which require effort in terms of contacting and enlisting the help of professional crime prevention agencies, including having police do security checks, obtaining property I.D. materials, and the like.
While some of these latter steps may have been recommended in other components of the Take a Bite Out of Crime campaign, they were not dealt with in the televised PSAs.
The panel findings clearly indicate that campaign exposure was generally unassociated with such purchases made during the period between the two surveys (Tables 6 and 7) , with the notable exception of getting a dog "at least partly for security purposes." While the campaign never specifically 
Percentage Changes in Preventive Activities
Despite the strength of the above relationships, it should be kept in mind that the campaign of course did not impact all persons encountering it, or even necessarily sizable wajorities. The findings may be seen in a 17.
somewhat more "pragmatic" light by examining the net percentage changes in Table 8 . The activities shown are those for which a significant campaignrelated effect was found.
In the first column, we report for rough baseline purposes the percentage of respondents consistently taking actions in the pre-campaign wave of interviews.
In the remaining columns, the net change in frequency of activity between the first and second interviewing waves are presented, for the campaign exposed and unexposed groups. 
Prevention Competence and Crime Orientations
The Take a Bite Out of Crime campaign appeared to have its strongest influences on prevention cognitions and attitudes among individuals feeling less threatened by crime. However, it seems to have influenced action-taking in differing ways among both more and less threatened citizens.
Campaign-related gains in prevention knowledge and confidence occurred .at significant levels only among those seeing their neighborhoods as relatively safe at night (Table 9 ) and those calling their environs less dangerous than others.
These findings suggest a somewhat counterproductive impact of the campaign in that prior to the campaign, the greater the perceived neighborhood crime threat, the lesser the levels of prevention knowledge and confidence among citizens (Table 10 ). Thus an "optimal" impact of the campaign would 18. have been in the direction of making those individuals who felt more threatened more knowledgeable and confident. However, the campaign appears to have had little influence on the prevention orientations of that group, and instead had a marked effect on those perceiving themselves as being in less crime-ridden locales.
Parallel results were found based upon the extent to which respondents saw themselves as vulnerable to burglary or violent crime (Table 11) .
Increases in prevention knowledge, effectiveness and confidence were found only among those seeing themselves "not at all likely" to be a victim of physical assault. Moreover, increases in prevention effectiveness and confidence were found only among those perceiving low risk of being burglarized.
(Prevention knowledge, however, did gain among those reporting a high burglary risk.)
Campaign-related gains in prevention action-taking, however, were quite mixed according to citizens' crime orientations.
For one thing, neigi'.borhood observing activity (including either watdhing on one's own or asking others to) showed the sharpest gains among individuals with perceptions of greater neighborhood crime and perceived vulnerability (Table 9) . Furthermore, neighbarhood organizational activity jumped significantly among those perceiving themselves as more at risk from burglary or assault. Adding to the striking nature of these findings is the indication that prim-to the campaign, more crime-threatened panel respondents were no more likely than the less threatened to engage in such cooperative efforts (Table 10) .
.0n_the basis ef_pe evidence here, the campaign "worked" quite effectively in prompting those citizens with the greatest felt need to protect themselves from crime to "do. something" in the form of the campaign-advocated cooperative measures. Those perceiving a greater crime threat were also likelier to have acquired a dog for security purposes. Police reporting rose only among lesser 'crime threatened respondents, but reporting appears to have been initially more frequent among high crime threat citizens, suggesting a ceiling effect.
Campaign-related organization joining increased significantly among those 14rceiving less neighborhood danger.
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Prevention Competence and Previous Prevention.Orientations
We also need to consider the possibility that levels of prevention competence were increased primarily among those cititens already more prevention conscious. Citizens with more positive cognitions and attitudes regarding prevention may not necessarily take actions congruent with those orientations. Thus the campaign appears to have stimulated greater overall levels of prevention competence among those initially less, rather than more, competent.
Prevention Competence and Media Orientations
As expected, crime prevention opinion leadership prior to the campaign correlated positively and significantly with prevention knowledge and confidence, and with police reporting,' neighborhood observing and organization joining (Table 13) . However, opinion leaders showed evidence of their persuasability in that those subsequently exposed to the campaign registered significant gains in how effective they saw citizen prevention measures as being, and in 20.
use of outdoor lights and in organization joining (Table 14) .
For many opinion leaders, the campaign may have substantiated their already existing perceptions of being knowledgeable and confident, and in'addition prolided them with arguments that citizen actions were more effective as well.
Contrarywise, non-opinion leaders showed substantial gains in levels of prevention knowledge and confidence, as well as in such activities as police reporting, neighborhood observing and the joining of groups. Not incidentally, these data further support a view of opinion leaders not being as necessary to information and influence dissemination processes as they may have been several decades ago (cf. Robinson, 1976; O'Keefe, 1982) . In this instance, the opinion "followers" appear to be undergoing changes as a direct consequence of exposure to the campaign. The extent to which some of those changes occurred through interaction with opinion leaders as well is unknown here, but it seems clear that campaign exposure per se was at a minimum a major agent of change.
Those respondents indicating a greater need for information about crime prevention prior to the campaign appeared generally less knowledgeable and confident, although somewhat more inclined to report suspicious incidents to police and to be watchful of their streets. (Table 13 ). The campaign appeared)
to benfit this group moreso than the less information curious in the sense of increasing their propensity for taking part in cooperative prevention activities,, acquiring a dog, and using outdoor lights (Table 14) . The campaign also appeared to raise their confidence about protecting' hemselves to higher levels.
On the other hand, the campaign seemed to stimulate greater cognitikve and attitudinal change among those seeing themselves with lesser informational needs, along with increasing prevention activities on just two dimensions.
Respondents who attended more to crime news and television dramas proved to be higher in pre-campaign prevention knowledge, and in perceived effectiveness of citizen prevention techniques. They (Table 13 ) also tended to be taking most of the prevention steps under study here. For them, exposure to the
McCruff campaign appears to have increased their confidelfe in protecting themselves (perhaps legitimizing information they had garnered from other media sources), and also strongly reinforced the range and intensity of. their c action-taking (Table 14) .
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CotIbborative Findings from the National Sample
The panel data supportive of the impact of the campaign are further corroborated by these general findings from the national sample survey: **Among those exposed to the Take a Bite Out of Crime PSAS, over a quarter said they had paid a great deal of attention to them, and threequarters reported paying at least "some" attention. Eighty-eight percent were able to verbalize a main point of the ads, with nearly a third of those mentioning cooperation with other people to help prevent crime as a main message.
**A strong majority of those exposed perceived the ads as effectively conveying their message, and said they found the information contained in them worth passing on to other people. The reactions were consistently favorable among all population subgroups, although younger persons tended to rate.the ads more positively.
**Nearly a quarter of those exposed said they had learned something new from the PSAs, and 46, percent said they had been reminded of thIngs they'd known before but had forgotten. Younger persons and women were likelier to report having been reinforced in this way.
**Upwards of half of the respondents recalling the ads said they had made them more concerned about crime and more confident in protecting themselves.
Over half said the P$As had made them feel more responsible about preventing ctime and in perceiving citizen group efforts as more effective.
**Twenty-two percent said the ads made them more fearful of being victimized, with women being likelier to report this than men.
**Nearly a fourth of the exposed sample said they had taken preventative, actions due to having seen or heard the ads, including improving household security and helping their neighbors in prevention efforts. Women were likelier to have reporied doing so than men.
DISCUSSION
All in all, the findings suggest that the .Advertising Council's Take a Bite Out of Crime PSAs had marked and consistent influences on 22. citizen perceptiOns and attitudes regarding crime preVention, as *ell as en their taking of specific preventative actions.
individuals. exposed to the campaign exhibited significant increases,' over those not expose in h6W7much they thought they knew about crime prevention.; how:effective they-thought citizen pievention efforts were;
and how confidentlthey felt about being able to potect'themselves fromcrime.
The PSAs also appeared to have a strong crime prevention actions bj, citizens. Exposure 
2, 6
seem likely that the behavioral change came at the end of a cumulative series of previous changes in orientations. The high threat-high risk group was indeed lower in prevention knowledge, effectiveness,and competence prior to the campaign, and thus they were not poised at a high attitudinal plateau "waiting" for a message or other stimulus to goad them into actiontaking.
What seems more likely is that the PSAs suggested behaviors to them which seemed reasonable enough to try out, perhaps on a quite experimental These may not be, for many people, effortless tasks.) At least some of these people may see themselves in rather desperate straits regarding their personal safety, and may be willing too try just about anything. Perhaps the -realistic touches in the "Gilstraps" and "Mini Marth" PSAs provided the
proper cues _relating to their own environments. However, they also appear to be witing to see some results before "adopt4ne those cooperative behaviors -with any confidence. They seemed to be trying out the actions before believing that they've learned anything, or that_they feel more confident, or that they believe that citizen prevention measures are neCessNrily'effective..
On the other hand, Tong the lesser threatened and at risk, the campaign appears tothave done a bitter job of stimulating cognitive and attitudinal changes, along with some action-taking as well, most notably police-reporting.
The pattern here is more ilscliito the classic reinforcement process, in which persons with'already somewhat positive orientations toward crime prevention become evOt mote positive through exposure to the campaign, and indeed take some actions which trey had not been carrying out before, or at least as extensively.
The campaign also appears to have stimulated greater overall levels of prev,4ation coppetenceamong thoseinitially less, rather than more, competent.
---
The lack of increased actkqn=taking among those more psychologically/disposed to crime prevention is not immediately explainable from these d ta. One possible hypothesis' is that they, perceived themselves as already doing as much It is.also noteworthy that the campaign seemed to stimulate greater cognitive and attitudinal change among those seeing themselves with lesser informational needs, along with. increasing prevention activities on lust two dimensions.
Thus we have yet another instance of mixed effects for mixed groups, although again it is possible to impose a certain logic on the pattern of firags-In this case, it seems likely that those indicating a need for inforMation'were looking for just that--some practical advice. They received.
a great deal of advice from the campaign advocating cooperative actions, and
.they put that advice to use, perhaps on an experimental basis. Attitudinal change was only partial here, and it may be another case of persons trying out the advice before committing themselves to it. Among the low information need group, in which cognitive and attitudinal levels were already high, the campaign served to reinforce or strengthen those even further, without a great deal-in the way. of concommitant behavioral changes taking place. While this group may haverbenefited from more action taking, they may have been too confident of their own position prior to the campaign, and not motivated to follow the specific information offered.
The campaign, perhaps for a variety of reasons, appeared to be transcending many of the audiencebound constraints which seem to Inhibit the wider dissemination of other crime prevention information campaign efforts.
25. Figures represent net percentages of respondents in each group changing in the'frequency with which they carried out each activity. (In the case of "Dog for Security," the net percentage changing dog ownership' status is reprceented.) .10* .14**
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